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NOTES
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR SHORT-LIVED
WORKS OF ART
INTRODUCTION
The Copyright Act of 1976 (Act)' signals a legislative intent to
expand the categories of works eligible for copyright protection. For
example, the Act explicitly protects nondramatic choreography and
pantomime,2 as well as live broadcasts that are taped simultaneously
with transmission.3 As the legislative history of the Act shows, Con-
gress anticipated that this expansion would continue as communica-
tions technology grows.4 A 1980 amendment 5 clearly applied the Act
to computer programs.6 New technology forced Congress to address
the conceptually difficult, but seldom litigated, copyright require-
ment that a work be fixed in a tangible form of expression. 7 Phrasing
the Act to cover as yet undiscovered 8 tangible forms of expression,
Congress left it to the courts to answer the more basic question of how
long a work must be fixed in tangible form before it is copyrightable.0
The thesis of this Note is that two types of briefly fixed or short-
lived works of art merit explicit copyright protection. The first type is
a collection and arrangement of objects that is in itself a work of art.
1. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp.
IV 1980)).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1980). Prior to the Act, works of this nature
were protected only if they could be considered "[d]ramatic or dramatico-musical
compositions." See 17 U.S.C. § 5(d)(1976). Courts have held that dance that did not
tell a story was not copyrightable. See Fuller v. Bemis, 50 F. 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1892);
Dane v. M. & H. Co., 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 426 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963).
3. See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 5659, 5665 [hereinafter cited as House Report]. 17 U.S.C. §
101 (Supp. IV 1980), in defining "fixed," provides that a "work consisting of sounds,
images, or both, that are being transmitted, is 'fixed'. .. if a fixation of the work is
being made simultaneously with its transmission."
4. House Report, supra note 3, at 51 ("The bill does not intend. . . to freeze the
scope of copyrightable subject matter at the present stage of communications tech-
nology ....").
5. Patent Rights in Inventions Made with Federal Assistance, Pub. L. No. 96-
517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3028 (1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 117 (1977 & West
Supp. 1982)).
6. H.R. Rep. No. 1307, pt. 2, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 6492, 6509.
7. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. IV 1980),
8. See House Report, supra note 3, at 51 ("Authors are continually finding new
ways of expressing themselves, but it is impossible to foresee the forms that these new
expressive methods will take.").
9. See id. at 53 (the definition of fixation "would exclude ... purely evanescent
or transient reproductions such as those projected briefly on a screen").
SHORT-LIVED WORKS OF ART
This display work is of great commercial value 10 and is created daily
for department stores, museums, advertising agencies, photography
studios, motion picture companies and magazines. The other short-
lived work considered in this Note is an environmental or "site" work
of art which by its very nature is temporary. Such works include a
"Running Fence" of nylon cloth strung across 24.5 miles of California
countryside" or lines painted in an unusual pattern on a city street.
Even though short-lived works of art fulfill the constitutional and
statutory requirements for copyright protection, artists, their employ-
ers and copyright lawyers rarely attempt to copyright them. 12 This is
the unfortunate consequence of congressional failure to give them
explicit copyright protection.' 3 Without such protection, a freelance
stylist who creates arrangements cannot bargain effectively for a fair
10. One of Congress' reasons for extending explicit copyright protection to a
work of authorship is the "commercial importance of the product to the national
economy." Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 562 (1973).
11. W. Spies & W. Volz, The Running Fence Project: Christo (rev. ed. 1980).
See infra notes 12, 127.
12. The need for copyright protection for an arrangement of objects first became
apparent to the student-author when she was Home & Design Editor of Ladies Home
Journal. In interviews with many designers and stylists she discovered that while the
artists felt entitled to a property right in their work, most of them had never tried to
assert it simply because they had no knowledge of it ever having been done. Increas-
ingly, however, artists and stylists are becoming more aggressive about pursuing their
rights, in part due to the influence of organizations such as the Graphic Artists Guild,
which sponsor seminars on the legal rights of artists. Also, a display of objects, such as
those in a store window, is increasingly being recognized as a work of art. See B.
Wood, Show Windows (1982), reviewed by Wintour, New York, Sept. 13, 1982, at
56.
Interviews with practicing copyright lawyers demonstrated that some are skepti-
cal about whether short-lived works of art qualify for copyright protection, while
others have, in fact, been copyrighting a variety of temporary environmental works.
See infra note 127. Florists' Transworld Delivery (FTD), for example, does not want
to copyright its flower arrangements because they may vary, depending on the
availability of flowers around the country. Moreover, they are not even sure that a
flower arrangement is protectible. Telephone interview with David Vaillancourt,
FTD attorney, Southfield, Mich. (Aug. 31, 1982). FTD does seek copyright protec-
tion, however, for certain of its containers, and trademark protection for the names
of its arrangements. Id. Similarly, Christo's lawyer intends to trademark the name of
some of this environmental artist's more monumental works, which no one could
afford to duplicate. Telephone interview with Scott Hodes of Arvey, Hodes, Costello
& Burman, Chicago, Ill. (Aug. 6, 1982). Trademarking the name, however, would
not prevent someone from photographing or otherwise copying the work.
13. This oversight is not Congress' first in the copyright field. Sound recordings,
for example, were not copyrightable until 1971. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No.
92-140, § l(b), 85 Stat. 391 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (1976 & Supp. IV
1980)). "[S]ound recordings are clearly within the scope of the 'writings of an author'
capable of protection under the Constitution, and the extension of limited statutory
protection to them was too long delayed." House Report, supra note 3, at 56; see also
Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 520 (1945)
(commenting on the "judicial pressing and squeezing" of art forms into statutory
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return from the photographers and magazines that employ her. In
turn, a magazine cannot prevent its competitors from duplicating and
photographing an arrangement it has financed and produced. Simi-
larly, an environmental artist cannot prevent others from photograph-
ing her work and reaping the economic reward she not only deserves
but needs in order to finance these especially costly works. 14 Extend-
ing protection to short-lived works would further the short-term con-
stitutional goal of giving an artist a fair return for her work,' 5 as well
as the long-term goal of promoting "the Progress of Science and the
useful Arts." 16
Part I of this Note sets up two examples of short-lived works of art
to which reference is made throughout the discussion. Part II shows
that these short-lived works of art fulfill the statutory, and indeed,
constitutional, requirements of originality and authorship. The third
requirement, that the works be fixed in a tangible form of expression,
is slightly more problematic. By analogy to traditionally recognized
works of authorship, however, short-lived works should be considered
copyrightable from the moment they are created. Part III investigates
the possibility of common-law copyright protection for short-lived
works of art and shows that such protection is illusory. While the Act
specifically did not preempt state-law protection for works not fixed in
tangible form, the states themselves require a work to be so fixed in
order to be protected. Finally, Part IV discusses the practical consid-
erations of extending copyright protection to short-lived works of art.
I. EXAMPLES OF SHORT-LIvED WoRKs OF ART
A. An Arrangement of Objects
A typical example of an arrangement of objects, to which reference
is made throughout this Note, appears on the cover of the August 1982
categories, and giving an example of how "motion-pictures were crowded into the
'photographs' compartment before they were separately listed by the 1912 amend-
ment.").
14. Christo's "Running Fence," for example, cost $3 million, which the artist
financed from the sale of some of his earlier works. W. Spies & W. Volz, supra note
11.
15. One purpose of copyright protection is to "secur[e] for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discov-
eries." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954);
Burke v. NBC, 598 F.2d 688, 691 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 869 (1979);
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 452 (C.D. Cal.
1979), rev'd in part, afJ'd in part and remanded, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3982 (U.S. June 14, 1982) (No. 81-1687). But see United States
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("The copyright law, like the
patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.").
16. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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issue of House Beautiful magazine. There the stylist decided to do a
story on homes with walls painted in the trompe loeil technique. The
wall shown on the magazine's cover has a blue and white vase painted
on it, with painted branches extending out of the vase and a bird
perched on a branch. The stylist gathered four vases from elsewhere in
the house and arranged them on a chest of drawers in perfect juxtapo-
sition to the painting. She asked the homeowner, who is a flower
stylist, to arrange flowers in one of the vases in counterpoint to the
bare branches on the wall. The freelance photographer then took a
picture of the entire arrangement.' 7
In the meantime, a photographer from the local newspaper ar-
rived, "'8 ostensibly to photograph the stylist and photographer at
work. What she did, in fact, was photograph all the other arrange-
ments that the stylist had created throughout the house. The stylist
may have wanted to assert copyright protection in her arrangement in
order to prevent the photographer from using her work before it was
published by House Beautiful.
The stylist, however, would not be the copyright owner in this
situation. As an employee of House Beautiful, her work would be
considered a "work for hire." 19 Similarly, when a freelance photog-
rapher signs an agreement to that effect with a magazine, her work is
also a work for hire.20 Therefore, House Beautiful is considered the
author of the work and the owner of the copyright.2 ' As a practical
matter, however, the stylist on the scene has to protect the magazine's
17. Telephone interview with Beverly McGuire, Tabletops Editor of House
Beautiful (Aug. 4, 1982).
18. While a newspaper photographer did not actually interrupt House Beauti-
ful's shooting of the painted walls, such an interruption is not infrequent, particu-
larly when a major magazine photographs a home in a small town. Telephone
interview with Liza Hamill, art director, Philadelphia, Pa. (Sept. 22, 1982).
19. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980) ("A 'work made for hire' is . . . a work
prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment."); see Scherr v.
Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 500 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 936
(1970).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980) ("[Al work specially ordered or commis-
sioned for use as a contribution to a collective work. . . if the parties expressly agree
in a written instrument signed by them . . . shall be considered a work made for
hire."); cf. Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847, 855 (D.N.J. 1981) (architectural
plans, not designated for statutory protection, are not subject to the statutory work
for hire doctrine).
21. See Murray v. Gelderman, 563 F.2d 773, 775 (5th Cir. 1977), aff'd on
rehearing en banc, 566 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1978); Siegel v. National Periodical
Publications, Inc., 508 F.2d 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1974); Lumiere v. Robertson-Cole
Distrib. Corp., 280 F. 550, 552-53 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 583 (1922);
Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640, 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), a-ff'd,
457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972); Avedon v. Exstein, 141 F.
Supp. 278, 279-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Dielman v. White, 102 F. 892, 894 (D. Mass.
1900).
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interest in her work by telling the newspaper photographer that the
work is copyrighted.
While this Note uses the House Beautiful cover for the purpose of
illustration, the thesis of the Note is equally applicable to other ar-
rangements. Copyright protection should cover, for example, Diana
Vreeland's costume exhibits for the Metropolitan Museum, a florist's
arrangement of flowers, a department store window display,
Bloomingdale's model rooms22 and even a theater company's stage set.
B. An Environmental Work of Art
Environmental works of art can also take many forms, but one
hypothetical work will be referred to throughout this Note. An artist,
after nine months of work, turned on the lights in twelve city sky-
scrapers in a unique pattern one night. To achieve the desired effect,
she had made detailed engineering drawings showing how each win-
dow and air shaft would be treated; for example, whether lights
would be on or off or shades up or down. A photographer took a
picture of this light display, which was published in the city's daily
newspaper. The photographer was subsequently approached by a
calendar company with an offer to buy the photograph. The artist
may have wanted to assert copyright protection in her work and to
require the photographer to pay her a fee before selling the photo-
graph.
II. SHORT-LIVED WORKS OF ART AND THE STATUTORY
REQUIREMENTS FOR COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
According to the Act, "[c]opyright protection subsists. . . in origi-
nal works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device."' 23 The three statutory requirements for
copyright protection derived from this definition are originality, au-
thorship and fixation.
22. No cases have been found that deal with whether room design is copyright-
able. But see infra note 50. It could be argued that interior design differs from a
decorative display of objects, such as that featured on the House Beautiful cover,
because room design is governed by practical considerations, such as how people will
use the room, and not solely by artistic considerations. Nevertheless, this Note takes
the position that interior design also should be copyrightable because the design of a
room is not only conceptually separable from its utility, but many elements of it are
also physically separable. See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text. Moreover, it
could be argued that Bloomingdale's purpose in creating the model rooms is not for
someone to live in them, but for them to be attractive enough to entice the shopper to
buy the furniture displayed. Obviously, it would not be in Bloomingdale's interest to
sue its customers for copyright infringement, but Bloomingdale's, in theory, might
want to copyright its rooms to prevent other stores from copying them.
23. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
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A. Originality
Because courts considered the concept of originality to be implicit in
the word "author" as used in the Constitution, originality was a
judicial requirement before it became a statutory requirement. 24 The
Supreme Court defined an author as one "to whom anything owes its
origin; originator; maker. '2 5  Under this definition, if two authors
independently conceived the same work, both works would be consid-
ered original for copyright purposes. 26 The courts have not created
strict criteria for originality,217 following instead the spirit of Justice
Holmes' advice on the dangers of "persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustra-
tions, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits."' 28  Courts
have since found sufficient originality for copyright purposes in a
color matching chart, 29 a candy box 30 and the label on a can of
furniture polish.3 1 The legislative history of the Act indicates that the
24. 1 M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 1.06[A] (1982); see Synercom Tech-
nology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1009 (N.D. Tex. 1978)
("[O]riginality is judicially imposed gloss upon the copyright statute .... "); House
Report, supra note 3, at 51 ("The phrase 'original works of authorship,' which is
purposely left undefined, is intended to incorporate without change the standard of
originality established by the courts under the present copyright statute."); 1 M.
Nimmer, supra, § 2.01[A] ("[I]t is now clearly established, both as a matter of
congressional intent, and judicial construction, that the originality necessary to
support a copyright merely calls for independent creation, not novelty." (footnotes
omitted)).
25. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884). This
definition comports with contemporary dictionary definitions. See, e.g., Webster's
Third New International Dictionary 146 (1976) (defining author as "one that is the
source of some form of intellectual or creative work ... esp: one that writes or
otherwise composes a book, article, poem, play, or other work which involves
literary composition and is intended for publication" and as "one that compiles
material ... in such a way that the finished compilation can be regarded as a
relatively original work").
26. Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1093 n.3
(2d Cir. 1977); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir.
1936), af'd, 309 U.S. 390 (1940); Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 147
(S.D.N.Y. 1924). In Sheldon, Judge Learned Hand hypothesized that "if by some
magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats's Ode on a
Grecian Urn, he would be an 'author,' and, if he copyrighted it, others might not
copy that poem .... " 81 F.2d at 54.
27. See, e.g., Soptra Fabrics Corp. v. Stafford Knitting Mills, Inc., 490 F.2d
1092, 1094 (2d Cir. 1974); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99,
102 (2d Cir. 1951).
28. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
29. Pantone, Inc. v. A.I. Friedman, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
30. Barton Candy Corp. v. Tell Chocolate Novelties Corp., 178 F. Supp. 577
(E.D.N.Y. 1959).
31. Drop Dead Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 326 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 907 (1964).
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Act adopts the courts' construction of originality: For a work to be
original, it does not have to be new, novel, ingenious or aesthetically
pleasing.32
An arrangement of lights in twelve buildings, involving an ambi-
tious conception and a complicated arrangement, would unquestion-
ably meet the low threshold of the originality requirement. Most
arrangements of objects would also satisfy the requirement, notwith-
standing the likely objection that an arrangement often consists of
objects made and copyrighted by another artist or of objects in the
public domain . 3  Such copyrighted objects may be used with the
permission of the copyright owner. 34  The stylist's copyright, how-
ever, would extend only to her arrangement of the previously copy-
righted material.3 5
Moreover, the few courts that have considered the originality of
arrangements have been alert to another possible danger in copyright-
ing them: that the author of every commonplace arrangement would
seek copyright protection. One of these courts, for example, refused to
find originality in a flower corsage that duplicated an arrangement
used for years in the flower industry.3
32. House Report, supra note 3, at 51; see L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536
F.2d 486 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976); Dolleraft Indus. v. Well-Made
Toy Mfg., 479 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
33. See Sawyer v. Crowell Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp. 471, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1942)
(referring to public domain as "sources ... available to anyone"), aff'd, 142 F.2d
497 (2d Cir. 1944). A work falls into the public domain when the statutory copyright
period protecting it has terminated. Protection lasted for 28 years with a 28-year
renewal term under the Copyright Act of 1909. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976) (1909 Act),
amended by 17 U.S.C. § 302 (Supp. IV 1980). The current Act provides protection
for a work, created after Jan. 1, 1978, during the life of its author plus 50 years. 17
U.S.C. § 302 (Supp. IV 1980). A work could also fall into the public domain under
the 1909 Act if it were "published" before statutory copyright was procured for it.
See Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 320 F. Supp. 1303,
1308 (N.D. Ill. 1970); 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 24, § 2.03[G]. See infra note 151 and
accompanying text.
34. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (Supp. IV 1980). As a practical matter, permission is easy
to obtain, especially if the copyrighted object will receive free publicity in a maga-
zine.
35. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (Supp. IV 1980); see Roy Export Co. v. CBS, 672 F.2d
1095, 1103 (2d Cir. 1982). In Roy Export the court dealt with the copyrightability of
the work performed by the compiler of a collective work: "[P]rotection is available
only for that part of [a compiler's] product that is original with him-for what he has
added to the component works, or for his skill and creativity in selecting and
assembling an original arrangement of those works, even if no new material is
added." Id. Securing permission to use another artist's work is a recurring task for
artists who specialize in collage. Often they cut up, rearrange and paste over another
artist's material. Interview with Gerald McConnell, Artist, New York City (Feb. 16,
1982).
36. Gardenia Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 776, 782
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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In two other infringement cases, courts considered the arrange-
ments of objects depicted in advertisements.3 7 They did not specifi-
cally single out the arrangements for protection, because the arrange-
ments in these cases were but component parts of a larger
composition.3 8 Nonetheless, each court did weigh the originality of
the arrangements, finding one "attractive"' 39 in the case in which the
copyright was upheld and the other "familiar" 40 in the case in which
it was not.
Most arrangements for which a stylist or her employer would seek
copyright protection, however, would be sufficiently original to merit
protection. 41 Although the House Beautiful stylist, for example, used
a painting, vases and flower arrangement with the permission of the
individual authors, her combination and juxtaposition of them are
37. Ansehl v. Puritan Pharmaceutical Co., 61 F.2d 131 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
287 U.S. 666 (1932); Miller Brewing Co. v. Carling O'Keefe Breweries, 452 F. Supp.
429 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
38. In Ansehl v. Puritan Pharmaceutical Co., 61 F.2d 131 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 287 U.S. 666 (1932), plaintiff had composed a newspaper ad that featured a
picture of an arrangement of eight toiletries. Defendant's ad, almost an exact dupli-
cate, included 10 toilet articles "arranged in much the same fashion as those shown in
the plaintiff's advertisement." Id. at 133. In holding that the defendant had infringed
plaintiffs ad, the court stated that the defendants "could not appropriate the plain-
tiff's advertisement by copying his arrangement of material, his illustrations and
language, and thereby create substantially the same composition in substantially the
same manner, without subjecting themselves to liability for infringement." Id. at
138.
In Miller Brewing Co. v. Carling O'Keefe Breweries, 452 F. Supp. 429 (W.D.N.Y.
1978), another infringement case, an arrangement of objects was filmed in a beer
commercial, which featured beer drinkers arm wrestling. The court noted that the
"camera immediately focuse[d] on a close-up of the familiar triumvirate of bottle,
can and filled foamy-headed glass of beer .... Id. at 435. The court found no
infringement, pointing out that beer drinkers arm wrestling in a tavern was an idea
or theme, and therefore not copyrightable. Id. at 440.
39. Ansehl v. Puritan Pharmaceutical Co., 61 F.2d 131, 132 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 287 U.S. 666 (1932).
40. Miller Brewing Co. v. Carling O'Keefe Breweries, 452 F. Supp. 429, 435
(W.D.N.Y. 1978).
41. Were the stylist, however, to recreate exactly a still life depicted in a painting
in the public domain, a court probably would not find her work sufficiently original
for copyright protection. Courts apply stricter standards to reproductions of works in
the public domain than to adaptations or rearrangements of preexisting works.
Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980) (mere reproduction,
with permission, of Walt Disney characters in plastic does not constitute enough
originality for copyright protection); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486,
492 (2d Cir.) (plaintiffs trivial variations on the original Uncle Sam bank in the
public domain did not merit copyright protection), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976).
But see Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951);
Doran v. Sunset House Distrib. Corp., 197 F. Supp. 940 (S.D. Cal. 1961), aff'd, 304
F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1962); Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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original enough to merit copyright protection. Similarly, when Diana
Vreeland collects costumes on behalf of the Metropolitan Museum and
arranges them on mannequins with proper lighting, accessories and
music, the resulting arrangement is original enough to be copyright-
able. 42
B. Authorship
Short-lived works of art fall readily into the statutory categories of
protectible "works of authorship." 43 The courts, however, in deter-
mining what constitutes authorship, have developed their own crite-
ria based on the purpose and terms of the copyright clause of the
Constitution. Careful to protect the expression of an idea, and not the
idea alone, they have resorted to two alternative principles in deter-
mining what qualifies as protectible expression: a selection-arrange-
ment principle and an enterprise principle. These principles evolved
from the courts' analysis of the term "writings" in the Constitution
and because of the fact that written works were the only category of
works protected by the first copyright statute.
1. Statutory Categories of Authorship
The Act lists seven broad categories of protected works of author-
ship. 44 Both environmental works and arrangements of objects could
be classified under category five: pictorial, graphic and sculptural
works. 45 An environmental work falls clearly under the sculptural
rubric.46  An arrangement of objects could also be classified as a
42. The costumes themselves, however, would not be copyrightable. See
Adelman, Inc. v. Sonners & Gordon, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); House
Report, supra note 3, at 55.
43. Congress used the term "works of authorship" in the Act to circumvent a
problem created by the term "all the writings of an author" appearing in the 1909
Act. 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1976), amended by 17 U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. IV 1980). Because the
1909 Act's term tracked the language of the Constitution, art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 ("secur-
ing ... to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their ... Writings"), it was thought
that works protected by the 1909 Act represented the outer, constitutionally permit-
ted, limit to protectible forms of expression. House Report, supra note 3, at 51. To
avoid this interpretation, Congress approved prior court decisions that "all the
writings of an author" constituted a smaller class of works than that envisioned by
the Constitution. It gave the fresh label "works of authorship" to this smaller class of
works, thereby leaving room for expansion of statutory coverage to future works.
House Report, supra note 3, at 51.
44. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. IV 1980) ("(1) literary works; (2) musical works,
including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompany-
ing music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and (7) sound
recordings").
45. Id. § 102(a)(5).
46. See House Report, supra note 3, at 55 ("Purely nonfunctional or monumental
structures would be subject to full copyright protection under the bill .... ).
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sculpture or, alternatively, as a compilation, a separate category pro-
tected by the Act. 47
Moreover, the categories, according to the legislative history, are
"'illustrative and not limitative,' and . . . do not necessarily exhaust
the scope of 'original works of authorship.' "48 The legislative history
cautions, however, that in spite of contemplated expansion, "there are
unquestionably ... areas of existing subject matter that this bill does
not propose to protect but that future Congresses may want to." 49
This language probably refers to subject matter to which Congress has
refused to grant copyright protection over the years,50 notably utilitar-
ian works that are thought to be more appropriate candidates for
patent protection.8 '
2. Case Law: The Idea and Expression in Authorship
Although historically Congress has established the categories of
copyrightable works, the courts have determined which works within
those categories have sufficient hallmarks of authorship to qualify as
"writings" of an "author" under the Constitution. 52 One of the first
Supreme Court cases to interpret the copyright clause said that writ-
ings must consist of "the fruits of intellectual labor."53 Building on
that case, courts have held that authorship requires an idea and its
expression. 54 Because a copyright in effect grants a monopoly 55 to an
47. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
48. House Report, supra note 3, at 53.
49. Id. at 52.
50. See 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 24, § 2.03[A], at 2-26 n.10. Professor Nimmer
notes that there was a footnote in a draft of § 102(a) of the Act which suggested that
typography, slogans, interior decoration and other such works were not intended to
be protected. He questions whether there is a "negative implication in the fact that
this exclusionary footnote was deleted from the Senate and House Committee Reports
for the bill as finally enacted, although this particular statutory language remained
unchanged." Id. Professor Nimmer concludes that since the concept of works of
authorship is intentionally left vague, "[t]he courts are thereby permitted, but not
required, to recognize as protectible, types of works not expressly included in the
seven category enumeration." Id. at 2-28.
51. House Report, supra note 3, at 55 (discussing "uncopyrighted works of indus-
trial design," such as typefaces and television sets); see Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, 579
F.2d 294, 298 (4th Cir. 1978) (discussing typeface designs); Jack Adelman, Inc. v.
Sonners & Gordon, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 187, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (discussing dress
designs).
52. See Ebenstein, Introduction to S. Rothenberg, Copyright Law at xxix (1956).
53. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (emphasis in original).
54. See Synercom Technology Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp.
1003, 1012-13 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Long v. Jordan, 29 F. Supp. 287, 288 (N.D. Cal.
1939); 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 24, §§ 1.08[D], 2.03[D].
55. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. IV 1980) (copyright grants an author the exclusive
right to reproduce the copyrighted work, prepare derivative works based upon it,
distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work, perform and display the
work publicly and authorize others to do any of the above).
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author, courts have refused to allow authors to copyright ideas
alone. 56  It is the expression of ideas that merits copyright protec-
tion. 57
The idea and its expression must be a two-step process.5 8 In Baker
v. Selden,59 the Supreme Court made this important distinction in
deciding that a blank double-entry bookkeeping account book was not
eligible for copyright protection: "[T]here [must be] a clear distinction
between the book, as such, and the art which it is intended to illus-
trate. ' 60  In other words, the court would not protect an expression
that was the idea itself.
With these basic concepts in mind, courts have approached their
analysis of what works constitute copyrightable expression. Because
the first copyright statute explicitly protected "any map, chart, book
56. Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 56 (1911) ("But it is the writing
only, and not the idea, that is monopolized; the mode of expression and not the
thought conveyed."); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738,
742 (9th Cir. 1971); see Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. v. Public Bldg. Comm'n,
320 F. Supp. 1303, 1310 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Grove Press, Inc. v. Greenleaf Publishing
Co., 247 F. Supp. 518, 525 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); O'Brien v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.,
68 F. Supp. 13, 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Bowen v. Yankee Network, Inc., 46 F. Supp.
62, 63 (D. Mass. 1942); Seltzer v. Sunbrock, 22 F. Supp. 621, 627 (S.D. Cal. 1938).
57. Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); Scott v. WKJG, Inc., 376 F.2d 467, 469 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 832 (1967); Musto v. Meyer, 434 F. Supp. 32, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
af'd, 598 F.2d 609 (1979).
58. See Long v. Jordan, 29 F. Supp. 287, 288 (N.D. Cal. 1939) (in literary and
artistic works, in which the arrangement of ideas represents labor separate from that
involved in developing the idea, copyright will protect that arrangement).
59. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
60. Id. at 102. The Court's distinction has been codified by the Act, which states:
"In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (Supp. IV 1980); see 1 M. Nimmer,
supra note 24, § 2.03[D]. The House Report, however makes it clear that computer
data bases and programs that incorporate authorship in the programmer's expression
of original ideas are copyrightable. House Report, supra note 3, at 54; see Patent
Rights in Inventions Made with Federal Assistance, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94
Stat. 3028 (1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 117 (1977 & West Supp. 1982)).
Professor Nimmer points out that such an extension raises a Baker issue: "Is it possible
to render protectible the 'expression' of a program without necessarily granting a
monopoly in its 'idea,' i.e., in the methodology or processes adopted by the program-
mer." 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 24, § 2.18[J].
The court in Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F.
Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978) addressed this problem as it applied to computer input
formats. The court found that when the order and sequence represented by the
formats were the expression, "the skilled effort is not separable, for the form, ar-
rangement, and combination is itself the intellectual conception involved. It would
follow that only to the extent the expressions involve stylistic creativity above and
beyond the bare expression of sequence and arrangement, should they be protected."
Id. at 1014 (emphasis in original).
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or books," 6' in the early years of copyright courts more readily ac-
corded copyright protection to works they recognized as "writ-
ings." 6 2  As a result, courts have held that copyright covers many
printed works, such as answer sheets 63 and telephone books,6 4 which
do not seem to be original works of authorship.
In finding that these printed works were entitled to copyright pro-
tection, courts have developed two alternative principles, which are
still the touchstones of authorship. The first principle is that copyright
protects the selection and arrangement of material.6 5 The second
principle is that copyright protects enterprise. 66
61. Public Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
62. One reason postulated for the courts' timid approach to three-dimensional
works is that when the Constitution and the first copyright statute were written, no
method existed for copying three-dimensional works to deposit with the Library of
Congress. See Note, Copyright-Study of the Term "Writings" in the Copyright
Clause of the Constitution, 31 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1263, 1298 (1956). There have been so
few cases dealing with three-dimensional objects that one court relied on fabric eases,
which often involve flower designs, to find that a plastic flower was a work of art
entitled to copyright protection. Prestige Floral v. California Artificial Flower Co.,
201 F. Supp. 287, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). As recently as 1972, another court observed
that the novelty presented by the case before it was that the work was not a literary
work, but a three-dimensional artificial flower. First Am. Artificial Flowers, Inc. v.
Joseph Markovits, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 178, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The court noted,
however, that "[t]he copyrightability of 'three-dimensional' works . . . cannot be
challenged .... " Id.
63. Harcourt Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. oi t,
522-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (discussing "writings" as used in the Constitution and in the
1909 Act).
64. Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937); accord North-
western Bell Tel. Co. v. Bedco of Minn., Inc., 501 F. Supp. 299 (D. Minn. 1980);
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Nationwide Indep. Directory Serv., 371 F. Supp. 900
(W.D. Ark. 1974).
65. Courts have applied the selection-arrangement principle to a wide variety of
works, including: the audio-visual display of a computer game, Atari, Inc. v. Arme-
nia, Ltd., 1981 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 25,328, at 16,845 (N.D. I1. Nov. 3,
1981) ("The worms travel in the same manner. The shots were fired in the same
manner. The whole arrangement was very similar."); a color matching chart, Pan-
tone, Inc. v. A.I. Friedman, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 545, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ("The
originality ... lay in the new arrangement employed to facilitate selection and
matching of colors .... "); a novel, Grove Press, Inc. v. Greenleaf Publishing Co.,
247 F. Supp. 518, 525 (E.D.N.Y. 1965) ("[Tlhe particular pattern employed in
arranging and expressing [the] idea is entitled to protection."); a play, Scott v.
WKJG, Inc., 376 F.2d 467, 469 (7th Cir.) (copyright protection confined to the
"arrangement of words the author uses to express his ideas"), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
832 (1967); a physics textbook, Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. v. Brown, 223 F.
Supp. 219, 224 (E.D.N.Y. 1963) (copyright protects the "conception, organization
and presentation of material whether new or old"); a newspaper article, Inter-City
Press, Inc. v. Siegfried, 172 F. Supp. 37, 41 (W.D. Mo. 1958) (article recounting
facts in the public domain entitled to copyright protection "if there is distinguishable
variation in the arrangement and manner of presentation which bespeaks of expres-
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a. Selection-Arrangement Principle of Authorship
Historically, copyrightable expression has been found in the au-
thor's selection and arrangement of material. As one court said in
applying this principle, "[t]he originality was displayed in taking
commonplace materials and acts and making them into a new combi-
nation and novel arrangement which is protectible by copyright. ' 7
Applying the selection-arrangement principle, courts have found au-
thorship even in such seemingly unoriginal works as a commercial
paper discount chart, 68 a compilation of freight tariffs,6 9 and a French
vocabulary list. 70
The selection-arrangement principle may also be applied to the
work of a stylist. Often she has to "scout" ten houses before finding
one with the type of wall painting she likes. She selects her own
"props" for a picture and then arranges all her material according to
the rules of composition and the caprices of her imagination, thereby
fulfilling the selection-arrangement criterion, which has been used to
find a work copyrightable ever since the first copyright statute was
passed in 1790.
Similarly, an environmental artist often takes commonplace mate-
rials such as building lights, and arranges them in an unusual compo-
sition. The artist in this case selects which buildings she wants to use,
which lights to turn on and which windows to darken in order to
come up with the arrangement that will best express her idea.
b. Enterprise Principle of Authorship
The 1909 Act extended explicit protection to "[b]ooks, including
composite and cyclopedic works, directories, gazetteers, and other
compilations. ' 71 In finding that such so-called "fact works ' 72 were
sion peculiar to authorship"); seed packets, Stecher Lithographic Co. v. Dunston
Lithographic Co., 233 F. 601, 603 (W.D.N.Y. 1916) ("[D]etails, design and combi-
nation of lines and colors originated with the complainant ...."); and a legal case
reporter. Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 649 (1888) (selection of cases, arrange-
ment of them in a particular order, syntheses of other cases cited in them, and
division of reports into volumes merits copyright protection).
66. See infra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
67. Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 363 (9th Cir.
1947).
68. Edwards & Deutsch Lithographing Co. v. Boorman, 15 F.2d 35 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 273 U.S. 738 (1926).
69. Guthrie v. Curlett, 36 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1929).
70. College Entrance Book Co. v. Amsco Book Co., 119 F.2d 874, 876 (2d Cir.
1941).
71. 17 U.S.C. § 5(a) (1976), amended by 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
72. This is the term Professor Gorman has used to describe maps, news and
historical accounts, directories, advertising art, photographs, and legal and business
forms. Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation of
Facts, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1569, 1570 (1963).
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works of authorship, however, courts had to resort to an enterprise
rationale: 73 "[T]he business of getting out a directory is an expensive,
complicated, well-organized endeavor, requiring skill, ingenuity, and
original research."' 74 Applying this principle, courts have found au-
thorship in a news photo,75 an index of names culled from the New
York Times Index78 and a gardening directory. 77
Some authorities have questioned whether copyright should protect
the enterprise that goes into creating "fact works."' 78 One commenta-
tor suggested that they more logically might be protected by the law
of unfair competition. 79  He noted:
73. The Second Circuit in particular has applied an enterprise rationale to pro-
tect fabric designs against infringement. When a textile company adapted a painting
in the public domain, Soptra Fabrics Corp. v. Stafford Knitting Mills, Inc., 490 F.2d
1092 (2d Cir. 1974), or merely expanded a purchased design to fit the rollers that
print the design on fabric, Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 295 F.
Supp. 1366 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 415 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1969), the courts found these
adaptations sufficiently original to qualify the fabric for copyright protection. 490
F.2d at 1094; 295 F. Supp. at 1368. On the other hand, when a fabric company sees
the "adapted" fabric, makes a slight change in it and prints it, courts in the Second
Circuit have been strict about finding infringement. E.g., Concord Fabrics, Inc. v.
Marcus Bros. Textile, 409 F.2d 1315, 1316 (2d Cir. 1969); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v.
Dan River Mills, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1366, 1368 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 415 F.2d 1007 (2d
Cir. 1969). These courts seem to recognize the first company's enterprise in detecting
potential in the design and spending the money necessary to adapt it to textile
printing techniques.
74. Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 485-86 (9th Cir. 1937).
75. Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 143 (S.D.N.Y 1968)
(originality found in the selection of camera, film, lens, site and time for the picture).
76. New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217
(D.N.J. 1977). In New York Times the publisher of the New York Times Index
brought an action for infringement against a publisher who was indexing names in
the Times Index. In determining the extent of the protection accorded works covered
by the enterprise rationale, the court said: "The nature of the Times Index does not
require extensive comment, except to note that it is rather in the nature of a collec-
tion of facts than in the nature of a creative or imaginative work." Id. at 221. See
infra note 169.
77. Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3, 5 (7th Cir. 1977) ("[Plain-
tiff] had collected and categorized [flower sources publicly available] by her own
individual effort.").
78. See Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1369-70 (5th Cir.
1981) (suggesting that directory cases be considered sui generis). One commentator
has noted that what courts most frequently find protectible in "fact works" is the
arrangement of data, because that. does little violence to the arrangement principle of
copyright protection. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the
Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 516, 527-28 (1981).
Denicola adds, however:
It is the effort of collecting that must be rewarded in order to preserve
incentive and safeguard the author's investment of time and money, not the
act of placing Abbott before Baker. Unable to find authorship in the process
of collecting, however, the courts continue to look to the act of arranging as
the touchstone for protection.
Id. at 528.
79. Gorman, supra note 72, at 1571.
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[T]he author's raw materials are objective data, and his unique
contribution is to gather these facts and to express them in language
or visual images so ordered as to be intelligible and useful to others.
The pattern and expression are basically mechanical and do not
reflect the personality of the author.8 0
Unlike arranging facts, arranging objects or lights in a building
involves a pattern and expression, which are creative, not mechanical,
and which do reflect the personality of the author. Although resort to
the enterprise principle is not even necessary for nonfactual arrange-
ments, if a court were to apply the principle, it would find that short-
lived works qualify thereunder. Producing a ten-page feature on wall
art or a costume exhibit requires extensive research to find appropriate
homes or clothes to feature. The authors must find props and accesso-
ries, sometimes must commission other artists and craftsmen to pro-
duce necessary accoutrements and must coordinate everyone's sched-
ules. Similarly, the task of just getting the permission required to turn
on lights in twelve city skyscrapers is an enterprise requiring ingenuity
and organization.
3. Objections to Finding Authorship in Short-Lived Works
Several objections to the finding of authorship in short-lived works
of art are easily answered. One objection is that arrangements of
objects are often created for the purpose of selling a product, be it a
china service, a watch or a bottle of wine, and therefore should not be
accorded copyright protection. The Supreme Court rejected this argu-
ment when it first addressed whether an advertisement was a proper
subject of copyright.8 ' The Court said that "[i]f there is a restriction
[in the words of the copyright act] it is not to be found in the limited
pretensions of these particular works."' 82  What the Court found
copyrightable in the advertisement, of course, was its arrangement of
material. 83
A second possible argument against copyright for short-lived works
is that they may be created for useful purposes and therefore may be
eligible for patent, rather than copyright, protection. In Mazer v.
80. Id. at 1570.
81. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
82. Id. at 250.
83. Id. ("There is no reason to doubt that these prints in their ensemble and in all
their details, in their design and particular combinations of figures, lines and colors,
are the original work of the plaintiffs' designer." (emphasis in original)); cf. Drop
Dead Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, 326 F.2d 87, 93 (9th Cir. 1963) (label on can of
furniture polish copyrightable), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 907 (1964). In S.C. Johnson
the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff had shown "beyond doubt the original
creation . . of a label particularly and peculiarly embodying the numerous com-
monplace elements contained in it." Id.
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Stein,8 4 however, the Supreme Court held that an artist could copy-
right a statue intended for reproduction as a lamp base, noting that it
found "nothing in the copyright statute to support the argument that
the intended use or use in industry of an article eligible for copyright
bars or invalidates its registration."'85 The Act codified this extension
of copyright protection, yet preserved the distinction that the design
of a useful article shall be copyrightable only to the extent the picto-
rial, graphic or sculptural features can exist apart from the utilitarian
aspects of the article. 6
This liberalization answers the argument that an arrangement of
lights in a building also serves to light the building. 7  The whole
purpose of the light arrangement, however, is to make the building
pleasing from the exterior, not to provide light to the interior, making
the artistic features of the work at least conceptually separable from
its utilitarian features. As one commentator observed about one of the
most famous environmental works of art, Christo's "Running Fence,"
"[it] did not contain sculptural features that were physically separable
from the utilitarian aspects of the fence, but the whole point of the
work was that the artistic aspects of the work were conceptually
separable."881
Short-lived works of art, therefore, readily meet both the selection-
arrangement and enterprise criteria of authorship employed by the
courts. Moreover, the courts have already rejected the argument that
an otherwise copyrightable work is excluded because it was created
for advertising use or because it fulfills some other useful function.
While courts originally developed these guidelines for application to
works that were in fact "writings," the Supreme Court has recently
noted that the term has "not been construed in [its] narrow literal
84. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
85. Id. at 218. But in his dissenting opinion in the same case, Justice Douglas
said:
The Copyright Office has supplied us with a long list of such articles which
have been copyrighted-statuettes, bookends, clocks, lamps, doorknockers,
candlesticks, inkstands, chandeliers, piggy banks, sundials, salt and pepper
shakers, fish bowls, casseroles, and ash trays. Perhaps these are all 'writings'
in the constitutional sense. But to me, at least, they are not obviously so. It
is time that we came to the problem full face.
Id. at 220-21.
86. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980); see House Report, supra note 3, at 54-55.
87. See infra note 127 (Copyright Office initially deemed a sculptural curtain a
useful article).
88. 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 24, § 2.08[B], at 2-95; see Kieselstein-Cord v.
Accessories By Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980) (belt buckle held copyright-
able because its sculptural element was conceptually, if not physically, separable
from its utilitarian purpose).
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sense but, rather, with the reach necessary to reflect the broad scope
of constitutional principles."8 9
C. Fixation in Tangible Form
The third statutory, and indeed, constitutional,"0 requirement for
copyright protection is that a work must be "fixed in any tangible
medium of expression." 91 According to the Act's legislative history,
a work would be considered "fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
sion" if there has been an authorized embodiment in a copy ...
and if that embodiment "is sufficiently permanent or stable" to
permit the work "to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated for a period of more than transitory duration."9
The problem with this definition of fixation arises from the Act's
definition of its key word "copy," which largely repeats that of fixa-
tion:
"Copies" are material objects . in which a work is fixed by any
method now known or later developed, and from which the work
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term "copies"
includes the material object ... in which the work is first fixed.93
Despite this circumlocution in the legislative history, it can be said
that the fixation requirement mandates, first, that the author create a
copy of her intellectual conception, and second, that the copy be
stable enough for other people to perceive it.
1. Embodying the Expression in a Copy
Just as the authorship requirements for copyright in written works
can be applied to short-lived works of art, the "copy" requirement as
89. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973); see Burrow-Giles Litho-
graphic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884); Chafee, Reflections on the Law of
Copyright: 1I, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 719, 735-36 (1945).
90. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. As Professor Nimmer has noted, although there
are no cases holding that tangible form is a prerequisite to copyright protection, if the
constitutional term "writings" is to have any meaning, it must at least suggest" 'some
material form, capable of identification and having a more or less permanent endur-
ance.' " 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 24, § 1.08[C][2] (quoting Canadian Admiral
Corp. v. Rediffusion, Inc., 1954 Can. Exch. 382, 383); see, e.g., Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (writings "include any physical rendering of the
fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor" (emphasis added)); Trade-Mark
Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) ("The writings which are to be protected are the fruits
of intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books, prints, engravings, and the
like." (emphasis in original)).
91. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
92. House Report, supra note 3, at 53 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980)).
93. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980).
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it has been applied to written works can also be applied to short-lived
works of art. Application of the "copy" requirement to a short-lived
work, however, raises the question whether the expression of the
idea-the display of vases, arrangement of lights or lines painted on a
city street-is also a tangible medium of expression, or, in other
words, the copy itself. One might argue that the arrangement has to
be recorded before it is fixed in a tangible form. There is no reason,
however, to require that the expression of the idea and its embodi-
ment in tangible form be subject to the same two-step process as the
idea and expression process. 94 Unlike the requirement that an idea and
its expression be separable to protect against granting a monopoly over
ideas, 5 no comparable policy exists to require the same separation
between the expression of an idea and its embodiment in a copy,
except for an incidental administrative one. 96 Indeed, the Act contains
no such requirement.
When an author completes a short story, with all the dialogue,
characters and events in place, her handwritten manuscript is a copy
and her work is protected from the moment of its creation. 97  By
analogy, when a stylist arranges a still-life, with vases, flowers and
furniture all in place, that is her manuscript and it likewise should be
considered a copy. 8 No additional "copy," such as a photograph,
should be necessary for copyright purposes, just as the manuscript's
embodiment in book form is not necessary in order to copyright a
novel.99 The same reasoning should apply to environmental works of
art: The artist's first expression in a form the public can perceive
should not have to be otherwise recorded to qualify for copyright
protection.
94. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
96. The administrative requirement of depositing copies with the Copyright
Office for the use of the Library of Congress, 17 U.S.C. § 407(b) (Supp. IV 1980), is
not relevant. See infra text accompanying notes 103-107.
97. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. IV 1980); id. § 408(a). Section 408 provides that a
copyright owner may register her work at any time. Registration, however, must
precede any infringement action. Id. § 411; Comment, The Fine Art of Preemption:
Section 301 and the Copyright Act of 1976, 60 Or. L. Rev. 287, 287-88 n.8 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Preemption]; see also 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 24, § 5.05 [B][1].
98. See Traylor, Choreography, Pantomime and the Copyright Revision Act of
1976, 16 New Eng. L. Rev. 227 (1981). Professor Traylor suggests that copyright
protection for choreography should be recognized from the moment a dance is "set"
in the body of a dancer, just as a painting is protectected from the moment the last
brush stroke is made. Id. at 234-35.
99. 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 24, § 2.04[D][2] (Even under the 1909 Act, "the
fact that a work was in typewritten, mimeographed, or other form which might be
regarded as a tentative rather than final form, did not derogate from its status as a
book for copyright purposes.").
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Language in the Act's legislative history is confusing on this point,
however, in that it does seem to require a two-step expression-copy
scenario. It states that "[t]he two essential elements-original work
and tangible object-must merge through fixation in order to produce
subject matter copyrightable under the statute."' 100 "Original work"
in this context, however, does not mean "expression." As one com-
mentator noted, "an 'original work' is not the first or the only physical
representation of a work. An 'original work' exists in the artist's mind,
and any embodiment of it, even in a unique representation, is a
'copy.' "101 This analysis, in fact, comports with another portion of
the legislative history: "It is possible to have 'an original work of
authorship' without having a 'copy' . . . and it is also possible to have
a 'copy' . . . embodying something that does not qualify as an 'origi-
nal work of authorship.' "102
Confusion over the definition of "copy," which beset the courts
before the Act became effective, persisted in part because of the
administrative copyright requirement that two copies of the work be
deposited with the Copyright Office for the use of the Library of
Congress. 10 3 The Act, however, specifically notes that such a deposit
is not a condition of copyright protection.10 4 The requirement merely
assures that once a work has been published with a copyright notice,
two copies of the work will be deposited within three months; failure
100. House Report, supra note 3, at 53.
101. See Millinger, Copyright and the Fine Artist, 48 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 354,
360 (1980).
102. House Report, supra note 3, at 53; see 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 24, §
1.08[C][2]. Professor Nimmer discusses the fact that a live television broadcast of a
sports event is not a writing in the sense of a work of authorship, and he questions
whether simultaneous videotaping, as provided by the Act, would make it one: "This
extension of the simultaneous recordation concept may well be held unconstitu-
tional .... ." Id. But in National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Copyright Royalty Tribu-
nal, 675 F.2d 367 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the court said that although the performance of a
sport was not copyrightable at common law, "[a]nyone who has ever watched ABC's
Monday Night Football, for example, knows that the commentary of the announcers
and such effects as instant replay in slow motion add immensely to the quality of a
sports telecast." Id. at 378. The court quoted the legislative history of the Act, which
shows that Congress based its extension of copyright to a sports broadcast on an
enterprise rationale:
When a football game is being covered by four television cameras, with a
director guiding the activities of the four cameramen and choosing which of
their electronic images are sent out to the public and in what order there is
little doubt that what the cameramen and the director are doing is what
constitutes "authorship."
Id. (quoting House Report, supra note 3, at 52). A live sports broadcast, however, is
not analogous to an arrangement of objects or an environmental work of art because
the content of the latter two works already satisfies the criteria for authorship. Short-
lived works do not require the act of filming to turn them into "works of authorship."
103. 17 U.S.C. § 407(a), (b) (Supp. IV 1980).
104. Id. § 407(a).
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to do so upon demand by the Register may result in a fine. 10 5 Neither
deposit nor registration, 0 6 however, should be confused with the
fixation requirement, 10 7 which is a statutory prerequisite to copyright
protection.
Keeping in mind judicial confusion, Congress, in writing the Act,
attempted to change the result in the only Supreme Court case'08 that
has dealt with the issue of fixation.' 0 9 In that case the Court found
that a piano roll did not constitute a copy of a musical composition
and therefore could be copied with impunity." 0 Defining a copy as
"'a written or printed record .. . in intelligible notation,' "I" the
Court decided that the rolls were not copies because even those skilled
in making the perforations on them could not read the holes as musi-
cal notes without the aid of a machine.1 2 The Act changes this
result by permitting fixation by any method through which a work
can ultimately be perceived, even if a machine is necessary to permit
perception." 3
A Second Circuit case, Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman," 4
abided by the change in the Act. In Stern the licensee of a video game
105. Id. § 407(d); House Report, supra note 3, at 150.
106. See supra note 97.
107. See Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, 1982 Copyright Law Rep. (CCH)
25,347, at 16,955, 16,959 (D. Md. Nov. 27, 1981). In Atari, the defendants
unsuccessfully argued that because the plaintiff had registered a videotape of their
computer game, rather than the circuit board in which it was fixed, it was not
entitled to copyright protection. Cf. CBS v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315, 320 (1st Cir.)
(character of Paladin not copyrightable; "[W]e cannot say that it would be imprac-
ticable to incorporate into the copyright system a procedure for registering 'charac-
ters' by filing pictorial and narrative descriptions in an identifiable, durable, and
material form."), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1007 (1967).
108. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
109. According to the House Report:
This broad language [of the statute] is intended to avoid the artificial and
largely unjustifiable distinctions, derived from cases such as White-Smith
Publishing Co.... under which statutory copyrightability in certain cases
has been made to depend upon the form or medium in which the work is
fixed. Under the bill it makes no difference what the form, manner or
medium of fixation may be-whether it is in words, numbers, notes,
sounds, pictures ... whether embodied in a physical object in written,
printed, photographic, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or any other stable
form, and whether it is capable of perception directly or by means of any
machine or device "now known or later developed."
House Report, supra note 3, at 52.
110. 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908).
111. Id. at 17.
112. Id. ("A musical composition is an intellectual creation which first exists in the
mind of the composer; he may play it for the first time upon an instrument. It is not
susceptible of being copied until it has been put in a form which others can see and
read.").
113. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
114. 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
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called "Scramble" copyrighted the game as an audiovisual work
rather than copyrighting the written computer program that deter-
mined the game's display.11 5 The infringing company argued that the
sights and sounds did not satisfy the statutory fixation requirement
because their sequence on the screen varied, depending on the actions
of each player."16
In holding that the audiovisual display was copyrightable, the
court concluded that the computer's memory device satisfied the
statutory requirement of a "copy" in which the work is fixed." 7 Such
a copy was needed in this case because the videotape did not reflect
the many possible renditions of the game." 8 In the case of a short-
lived work of art, however, no comparable reason exists for requiring
a separate copy."n9
115. Id. at 855. The reason the plaintiff copyrighted the audio-visual display
rather than the computer program was to prevent "knock-offs" of the display by an
infringer who had merely to write a new computer program to produce the same
images and sounds on the screen. See also 1 M. Nimmer, supra 24, § 2.18[H][3][b].
116. 669 F.2d at 855; see In re Certain Coin-Operated Audio-Visual Games and
Components Thereof, 1981 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 25,299, at 16,666 (U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n June 25, 1981). The Commission noted that "for statistical reasons, it
is virtually impossible for a performance of Galaxian ever to duplicate that perform-
ance fixed in the video tape." Id. at 16,680. The Commission also discussed, but
declined to rule on, whether a player of a video game might be considered a coauthor
of each performance of the play mode. Id.
117. 669 F.2d at 856; see Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, 1982 Copyright L.
Rep. (CCH) 25,347, at 16,955, 16,959 (D. Md. Nov. 27, 1981); Midway Mfg. Co.
v. Dirkschneider, 1982 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 25,358, at 17,006, 17,015 (D.
Neb. July 15, 1981); cf. Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F.
Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (applying the Act to find that a computer program
imprinted on a silicon chip, which enabled the computer to read the program and act
on its instructions, satisfied the fixation requirement). But see Data Cash Sys., Inc. v.
JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1068-69 (N.D: Ill. 1979) (applying the 1909
Act to find that a "Read Only M'emory" is not a copy of a computer program, and
therefore, like a piano roll, could be copied with impunity), aff'd on other grounds,
628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980). In dicta, the Data Cash court misinterpreted the Act
to require the result it reached under the 1909 Act. Id. at 1068.
118. Arguably the copy was also needed because the entire "play mode" of a video
game could neither be seen nor heard until a player inserted his money in the
machine. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artie Int'l, Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1152, 1153-
54 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (distinguishing a video game's "attract mode," which entices a
player, from its "play mode," which engages the player).
119. Similarly, in copyrighting choreography, it has been suggested that the
dancer's body is the material object in which the work is fixed, and that no additional
fixation is necessary. Traylor, supra note 98, at 238. In fact, Professor Traylor noted
that a choreographer often employs one dancer whose task it is to remember the
choreographer's works and, in effect, to be the company's living archive. Id. She
argues that a videotape or film of a dance is an imperfect record because the camera
only records from one angle and therefore does not create a perfect record of each
step. Id. at 234. While several dance notation systems exist, very few dancers can
write the notation and fewer still can perform from it. Id. at 233. See also Comment,
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The Act would also presumably change the result in a case that
hinged on the loss of statutory copyright protection when a work
entered the public domain. 120  In that case the City of Chicago al-
lowed a model of a monumental sculpture designed by Picasso to enter
the public domain. 12 ' The city had permitted widespread reproduc-
tion of the uncopyrighted model before the sculpture was built.122
Once it was built, the city obtained statutory protection for the sculp-
ture. The court declared the city's copyright invalid in a suit brought
by a publisher who wanted to market a copy of the sculpture. In
relevant dicta, the court said:
The monumental sculpture did not exist at this point in time [when
the model entered the public domain] and accordingly there could
be no copyright in the monumental sculpture, either common law
or statutory. It is settled that a copyright can exist only in a percep-
tible, tangible work. It can not exist in a vision. 23
Had this case been decided under the Act, common-law copyright
would not have been an issue. The court, therefore, would have had
to determine whether the model was a copy. The Act recognizes the
distinction between a work of authorship and the many kinds of
copies that may embody it. 24 Thus, there should be no doubt under
Moving to a New Beat: Copyright Protectionfor Choreographic Works, 24 U.C.L.A.
L. Rev. 1287, 1294 (1977), in which the author discusses the current laws protecting
choreography. This Comment is interesting to read in conjunction with Traylor's
article, supra note 98, which focuses more on the practical problems of copyrighting
choreography.
120. Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 320 F. Supp. 1303
(N.D. Ill. 1970).
121. Id. at 1309. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
122. 320 F. Supp. at 1306-07.
123. Id. at 1310 (footnote omitted). Other courts in dicta have glossed over the
tangibility requirement, treating it merely as a safeguard against copyrighting an
idea. E.g., Uneeda Doll Co. v. P. & M. Doll Co., 353 F.2d 788, 789 (2d Cir. 1965)
("It is well settled that there can be no copyright on an 'idea' itself but only on the
tangible 'expression' of the idea."); Roy Export Co. v. CBS, 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1148
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("The requirement of tangible form.., establishes only that a mere
idea is not copyrightable: only a tangible work is."), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.
1982); O'Brien v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 13, 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1946)
("[A]n author has no property right in his ideas unless . .. given embodiment in a
tangible form."); Bowen v. Yankee Network, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 62, 63 (D. Mass.
1942) ("Ideas not reduced to concrete form are not protected."); cf. Chafee, supra
note 13, at 504 ("The word 'Writings' [under the 1909 Act] seems to exclude from
copyright protection, not only ideas still in the author's head, but also transitory
expressions of his ideas.").
124. House Report, supra note 3, at 53 ("Thus... a 'book' is not a work of
authorship, but is a particular kind of 'copy.' Instead, the author may write a
'literary work,' which in turn can be embodied in a wide range of 'copies'... in-
cluding books, periodicals, computer punch cards, microfilm, tape recordings, and
so forth."); Millinger, supra note 101, at 359; accord 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 24,
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the Act that Picasso's work of authorship, his intellectual conception,
was the monumental sculpture, and its model was merely a conven-
ient means of reducing it to tangible form.
Although short-lived works of art can be embodied in a wide range
of "copies," including artists' renderings, engineering drawings, pho-
tographs, films, magazine layouts and calendars, such works should
be considered embodied in a copy, and therefore entitled to copyright
protection, from the moment they are created.
2. The Stability of the Copy
The second fixation criterion under the Act is that the copy in
which the work is embodied must be stable enough for it " 'to be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of
more than transitory duration.' "125 Because Congress' goal was to
make the Act broad enough to cover as yet unforeseen forms of
expression,'2 6 it did not address the narrower, more fundamental issue
of how long the work must be fixed in tangible form in order to be
considered stable. As a result, artists do not know whether a one-
month window display, a three-month arrangement of paintings on
the wall of a museum or a light show performed every night during
the summer is fixed long enough for copyright purposes. 2 7
The legislative history does note that fixation would exclude "purely
evanescent or transient reproductions such as those projected briefly
on a screen, shown electronically on a television or other cathode ray
tube, or captured momentarily in the 'memory' of a computer."'' 2
The history also suggests some examples of unfixed works: "[C]horeog-
raphy that has never been filmed or notated, an extemporaneous
speech, 'original works of authorship' communicated solely through
§ 2.03[C] ("There is but a single work of authorship, no matter how numerous and
diverse the copies.").
125. House Report, supra note 3, at 53.
126. Id. at 52. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
127. One commentator has suggested that the work of a conceptual artist such as
Christo would not meet the fixation requirement because his "Running Fence" and
"Wrapped Buildings" last too short a time. Millinger, supra note 101, at 359.
Christo's lawyer, however, said he did not attempt to copyright the "Running Fence"
because of the problem of putting proper copyright notice on its 24.5-mile span.
Telephone interview with Scott Hodes of Arvey, Hodes, Costello & Burman, Chi-
cago, Ill. (Aug. 6, 1982). See infra notes 162-64 and accompanying text. When he
attempted to register Christo's "Valley Curtain" with the Copyright Office in 1972,
the Office initially rejected the application because it deemed a curtain a useful
article. Hodes convinced the Office, however, that the 200,000 square-foot bright
orange curtain, which was hung outdoors, was a work of art, rather than a useful
item. Hodes registered a sketch of the proposed curtain with the Copyright Office,
which raised no objection about the length of time the curtain would stay in place.
The curtain stood for less than 27 hours before it was blown down by the wind.
128. House Report, supra note 3, at 53.
[Vol. 51
SHORT-LIVED WORKS OF ART
conversations or live broadcasts, and a dramatic sketch or musical
composition improvised . . . without being recorded or written
down." 129  Obviously, an arrangement of objects or of lights in a
building is more permanent than any of the works in this list.
The courts, like Congress, have not addressed the question of how
long a work must be fixed in a copy for it to be stable. Even the Stern
court, in deciding that the audiovisual display of a video game was
sufficiently "fixed," emphasized the sights and sounds that remained
constant during each play of the game, rather than the duration of
time in which they were seen and heard.°30
Both an arrangement of objects and a pattern of lights in a building
last longer than a transient image on a screen. The argument that is
raised about an arrangement of objects in particular, however, is that
someone can move the objects in the arrangement around, defeating
the fixation requirement. Yet, the same argument can be applied to
almost any three-dimensional work of art. An arrangement of objects
is not physically, but visually, held together. It is the tension between
the objects that lets the eye know where the arrangement begins and
ends. This is true of many sculptural works, such as Henry Moore's
"Reclining Figure," comprised of two separate masses of stone which
must be placed in proper juxtaposition to each other, and Alexander
Calder's mobiles, which take on different configurations when their
metal pieces are moved by a breeze. Just as moving one of Moore's
sculptural pieces two inches or swinging Calder's masses of metal in
the breeze does not destroy the respective works, moving one of the
objects in an arrangement would not destroy it as a work of art. In
fact, it is the selection of elements that are juxtaposed with each other
as much as their actual juxtaposition, that makes Moore's and Calder's
sculptures so effective. Similarly, the selection of objects that makes
up an arrangement largely determines how effective the arrangement
will be. If these items are always present in the arrangement, like the
sights and sounds in a video game, a slight rearrangement will not
destroy the work. Indeed, copyright has often protected the enterprise
involved in selecting materials, such as the names for a telephone
book, even when no art has been required in their arrangement.13'
The proliferation of computer games may cause other courts to
liberalize the fixation requirement. Just as the term "writings" has
been liberally interpreted by the courts to further the constitutional
purpose of protecting artists' property rights in their work and pro-
moting artistic progress, so should the tangibility requirement of the
statute be liberally construed.
129. Id. at 131.
130. Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856-57 (2d Cir. 1982).
131. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
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III. THE INADEQUACY OF COMMON-LAW COPYRIGHT
If a court were to find that neither an arrangement of objects nor a
pattern of lights in a building are sufficiently fixed for statutory
copyright protection, such short-lived works would be left to the
protection of state law.132 The Act, while preempting state laws that
protect the same rights as the statute does, specifically provides that it
does not limit or annul state laws or statutes covering works of author-
ship not fixed in any tangible medium of expression. 133 State copy-
right law is generally referred to as "common-law copyright,"' 134 al-
though it is more accurately termed "right of first publication." 1
35
Common-law copyright has been defined as "an author's proprie-
tary interest in his literary or artistic creations before they have been
made generally available to the public. It enables the author to exer-
cise control over the first publication of his work or to prevent publi-
cation entirely . . . . ,13 Thus, for example, when the stylist found a
newspaper photographer recording her work, she could have asserted
a common-law copyright in her arrangement. She had the right, on
behalf of the magazine that employed her, to protect the magazine's
right to publish her work first.
The extent of legal protection provided unfixed works by the pre-
emption loophole, however, is negligible. Since common-law copy-
right is a state-law doctrine, each state would look to its own laws in
deciding whether to extend protection to unfixed works. 137 Accord-
ing to Professor Nimmer, "[t]here have been no cases squarely ruling
132. The Act provides:
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equiva-
lent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106 in works of authorship that arefixed in a tangible
medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright...
are governed exclusively by this title.
17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis added). Professor Nimmer has inter-
preted this language to mean that "any work which is not 'fixed in a tangible medium
of expression' is indisputably immune from federal preemption." 1 M. Nimmer,
supra note 24, § 2.02.
133. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b) (Supp. IV 1980); Preemption, supra note 97, at 288.
134. 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 24, § 2.02.
135. E.g., Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 326 (2d Cir. 1978); Estate of
Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 346, 244 N.E.2d 250, 254, 296
N.Y.S.2d 771, 776 (1968).
136. Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 345-46, 244
N.E.2d 250, 254, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771, 776 (1968).
137. See 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 24, § 2.02. New York has a statute protecting
an "unpublished, undedicated or copyrighted dramatic composition, or musical
composition known as an opera." N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 338 (McKinney 1968). The
statute makes it a misdemeanor for anyone to perform publicly such a work without
the consent of the owner. Id.
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on the question of whether common law copyright may be claimed in
a non-tangible oral or visual expression."138
New York common law to date, however, seems to require that a
work be in a tangible form before it may be accorded common-law
copyright protection. 139 The New York Court of Appeals, in lengthy
dicta, once entertained the idea of common-law copyright protection
for conversation. 40  Ernest Hemingway's widow sued Random
House, the publisher of A.E. Hotchner's conversations with her hus-
band, for infringement. She argued that Hemingway's conversation
one "day became his written manuscript the next.' 4' The court ac-
knowledged that New York law required a work to be in tangible
form for common-law protection,142 but quoted Nimmer's contention
that the underlying rationale for common-law copyright applied
whether a work was tangible or not. 43 The court, in any event,
merely entertained the problem of copyright for conversation, decid-
ing that Hemingway had approved of Hotchner's use of his conversa-
tions.1 44
138. 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 24, § 2.02.
139. Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 346, 244
N.E.2d 250, 254, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771, 776 (1968); Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N.Y. 532
(1872); accord Falwell v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 1204, 1207-08 (W.D.
Va. 1981); see Roy Export co. v. CBS, 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1148 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
("[O]nce that idea had been embodied in tangible form, as it was in the Compilation,
then the skill and talent of the producer is entitled to common law copyright
protection .... "), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982). But see CBS v. Documenta-
ries Unlimited, Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Jenkins v.
News Syndicate Co., 128 Misc. 284, 219 N.Y.S. 196 (Sup. Ct. 1926). In Documen-
taries Unlimited the court granted summary judgment to Allan Jackson for defend-
ant's infringement of his common-law copyright in his broadcast coverage of Presi-
dent Kennedy's death. "A broadcaster's voice and style of talking is, to all intents and
purposes, his personality, a form of art expression, and his distinctive and valuable
property." 42 Misc. 2d at 725, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 811. In Jenkins a freelance writer
"talked" her whole story to an editor, but then decided not to write it. The editor
printed her opinions in the form of a purported interview, using her very words. The
court said the writer had produced a literary work in which she had a common-law
property right. 128 Misc. at 286, 219 N.Y.S. at 199.
140. Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc. 23 N.Y.2d 341, 349, 244
N.E.2d 250, 256, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771, 779 (1968).
141. Id. at 345, 244 N.E.2d at 253-54, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 776.
142. Id. at 346, 244 N.E.2d at 254, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 776.
143. "However, as a noted scholar in the field has observed, 'the underlying
rationale for common law copyright (i.e., the recognition that a property status
should attach to the fruits of intellectual labor) is applicable regardless of whether
such labor assumes tangible form' (Nimmer, Copyright, § 11.1, at 40)." Id. at 346,
244 N.E.2d at 254, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 777. Professor Nimmer argues that if a writer
made an oral submission of a manuscript to a motion picture studio, there should be
no reason to give the author less of a property right in the oral submission than in a
written submission under common-law copyright. 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 24,
§ 2.02.
144. 23 N.Y.2d at 349-50, 244 N.E.2d at 255-56, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 778-79.
1982]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
Even if unfixed works were accorded common-law copyright pro-
tection by the state courts, the common-law doctrine raises the prob-
lem of "publication,"1 45 a concept that the legislative history of the
Act terms "increasingly artificial and obscure,"1 46 and a concept
which the Act was designed to eliminate. 147 Under the common-law
copyright doctrine, an author's right to first publication is extin-
guished, by definition, when the work is first published. 48  To avoid
harsh results, courts have distinguished between a limited publica-
tion, 149 which will not divest an author of her common-law copy-
right, 150 and a general publication, which will. 151 An author "can
distribute or show [her work] to a limited class of persons for a limited
purpose . . . . A general publication occurs when a work is made
145. Preemption, supra note 97, at 287 n.7 (under the 1909 Act "the word 'publi-
cation' was a legal word of art fixing the moment at which works were divested of
common law protection and subject to statutory copyright").
146. House Report, supra note 3, at 130.
147. Id. at 129-30.
148. Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 320 F. Supp.
1303, 1308 (N.D. Ill. 1970) ("The common law copyright is terminated by publica-
tion of the work by the proprietor of the copyright." (footnotes omitted)); see Roy
Export Co. v. CBS, 672 F.2d 1095, 1101 (2d Cir. 1982); Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N.Y.
532, 536 (1872).
149. In White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 957
(1952), the court defined a limited publication as one in which a work is communi-
cated "to a definitely selected group and for a limited purpose, and without the right
of diffusion, reproduction, distribution or sale." Id. at 746-47.
150. E.g., Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912) (public performance of a play
does not result in abandonment to the public use); American Tobacco C. v. Werck-
meister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907) (admission of public to gallery with tacit understanding
that no visitor is permitted to copy the works on display does not result in loss of
copyright); Roy Export Co. v. CBS, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982) (one-time showing
of compilation of Charlie Chaplin movie clips as part of Academy Awards not
publication sufficient for loss of common-law copyright); Patterson v. Century
Prods., Inc., 93 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1937) (motion picture of African safari shown to
many thousands of people without charge and without permission to copy was
limited publication), cert denied, 303 U.S. 655 (1938); King v. Mister Maestro, 224
F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (Dr. King's oral delivery of his "I have a dream"
speech was not a dedication to the public); accord CBS v. Documentaries Unlimited,
42 Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
151. E.g., White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.) (manuscript, which author
sent to anyone requesting one, fell into the public domain), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
957 (1952); Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. v. Public Bldg. Comm'n 32d F. Supp.
1303 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (extensive press campaign to publicize the "Chicago Picasso"
resulted in a general publication); see National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett
Publications, 191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951) (absence of copyright notice on one
Superman comic strip published in syndicated newspapers resulted in loss of copy-
right in those strips but not in subsequent ones in which notice was proper).
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available to members of the public at large without regard to who
they are or what they propose to do with it." 152
The Act, for purposes of defining legal relationships only, defines
publication as occurring when the author offers or distributes her
work to the public by sale or in such a way as to suggest transfer of
ownership.' 53 Because this codification is not binding on the states,'
154
however, and because publication is decided on a case-by-case basis,
an artist is provided with little certainty. 155 Since the courts them-
selves have not yet explored what protection they may still afford
artists as a result of the preemption loophole, lawyers cannot predict
when a court will uphold a common-law copyright. It would be
unrealistic, therefore, to expect an artist to assert a common-law
copyright in her work when a newspaper photographer attempts to
record it before she can. 156
IV. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF EXTENDING COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION TO SHORT-LIVED WORKS OF ART
A. Notice
The Act provides that whenever a work is published by authority of
the copyright owner, it must bear a copyright notice, 1 7 which "shall
be affixed to the copies in such manner and location as to give reason-
able notice of the claim of copyright."' 58  Congress left it to the
152. Burke v. NBC, 598 F.2d 688, 691 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 869
(1979).
153. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980); see Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546,
570 n.28 (1973).
154. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
155. One commentator, concerned about the continued problem of publication
for intangible works, suggested that the "copyright power, supplemented by the
'necessary and proper' clause permits federal regulation of a work anticipating its
fixation." Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright: Proposals and Prospects, 66
Colum. L. Rev. 831, 841 (1966).
156. Many artists have been slow to copyright their works, even when such works
are clearly protected by statute. See generally Sheehan, Why Don't Fine Artists Use
Statutory Copyright?, 22 Bull. Copyright Soc'y 242 (1975). Sheehan's survey of
artists turned up three reasons why artists do not use copyright: 1) They do not know
enough about it; 2) they feel a copyright notice will deface their work; and 3) they
fear influential collectors will shun works bearing copyright notice. Another com-
mentator has concluded that artists also fear alerting purchasers to the fact they
retain rights in their work. Millinger, supra note 101, at 372.
157. 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (Supp. IV 1980). The form of notice shall consist of the
letter "C" within a circle or the word "Copyright" or the abbreviation "Copr.," as
well as the year of first publication (with certain exceptions) and the name of the
copyright owner of the work or a recognizable abbreviation. 17 U.S.C. § 401(b)(1)-
(3) (Supp. IV 1980). Lack of notice will prevent the artist from recovering actual or
statutory damages from an innocent infringer who relied on the lack of notice in
copying the work. Id. § 405(b).
158. 17 U.S.C. § 401(c) (Supp. IV 1980); see Scherr v. Universal Match Corp.,
297 F. Supp. 107, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (notice on a backpack on a statue of a man
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Register of Copyrights to prescribe the specific methods of fixing
notice on various works.15 9 The latter's rules are flexible. 160 The Act
has liberalized the notice requirements so that errors or omissions will
not result in copyright forfeiture.6 While attaching notice of copy-
right requires ingenuity in the case of some environmental works, 1
62
the problem is not insurmountable. For example, the artist who cre-
ated an arrangement of lights in the buildings could have worked
proper notice into her design.163
Also, in the case of three-dimensional works, notice is proper if it is
cemented or permanently secured to a visible portion of the work or to
any base or framing to which the work is permanently attached. 16
4
For example, if a stylist created a window display, notice on the base
of the arrangement or on the window itself would be sufficient.1 5 As
for a stylist who creates an arrangement for use in a magazine, and
who does not sign a work-for-hire agreement, notice in the magazine's
table of contents or other listing of acknowledgements would be suffi-
cient to protect her copyright. 166
B. Fair Use
Both the photographer who photographs a magazine editor at work
for her local newspaper, and the photographer who photographs an
standing twenty-two feet above the ground was not sufficient notice of copyright),
aff'd on other grounds, 417 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 936
(1970); Sheehan, supra note 156, at 258-60.
159. 17 U.S.C. § 401(c) (Supp. IV 1980).
160. 42 Fed. Reg. 64,377-78 (1977) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 201.20(i)
(proposed Dec. 23, 1977), reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. app. at 107 (West Supp. 1982))
provides a number of alternative placements for copyright notice in pictorial,
graphic and sculptural works, such as notice on a tag or on the container in which a
work is housed.
161. 17 U.S.C. § 405(a) (Supp. IV 1980); House Report, supra note 3, at 146-48;
see Coventry Ware, Inc. v. Reliance Picture Frame Co., 288 F.2d 193 (2d Cir.) (1909
Act liberal enough to allow notice on the back, as opposed to the front, of a three-
dimensional wall plaque), cert denied, 368 U.S. 818 (1961).
162. The Register of Copyrights, in promulgating rules, should be cognizant of the
special problems that arise for authors of environmental works. A provision that the
copyright notice appear at the beginning and end of a 24.5-mile "Running Fence,"
for example, would afford some certainty to both authors and "innocent" infringers.
163. The artist would have had to work only five characters or symbols into her
design to fulfill the statutory requirement of notice. Those would have been a "C"
within a circle, the last two digits of the year and her initials. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 401(b)(1)-(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
164. 42 Fed. Reg. 64,377-78 (1977) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 201.20(i)(2)
(proposed Dec. 23, 1977), reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. app. at 69 (West Supp. 1982)).
165. Id.
166. 17 U.S.C. §404(a) (Supp. IV 1980) provides that a separate contribution to a
collective work bearing its own notice of copyright or a single notice applicable to the
collective work as a whole is sufficient to give notice of the copyright with respect to
the separate contributions.
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arrangement of lights in a building for a city newspaper, may raise the
defense of "fair use" in a copyright infringement action. Fair use has
been defined as "a 'privilege in others than the owner of a copyright to
use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his
consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner.' "167
Courts apply the fair use doctrine when it is necessary to "subordinate
the copyright holder's interest in a maximum financial return to the
greater public interest in the development of art, science and indus-
try." 68 In general, creative or imaginative works are more protected
from fair use than factual works. 69
The courts consider four factors, codified by the Act, 170 to deter-
mine whether fair use will be found: the nature and character of the
use; '7 the nature of the copyrighted work; 72 the amount and sub-
167. Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir.
1966) (quoting Ball, Copyright and Literary Property 260 (1944)), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1009 (1967); see Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen
Comm., 457 F. Supp., 957, 960 (D.N.H. 1978) ("[T]he exclusive right of a copyright
holder must be weighed against the public's interest in dissemination of information
affecting areas of universal concern.").
168. Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 822 (1964); see Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers,
Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 1980); Wainwright Sees., Inc. v. Wall St.
Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978);
Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243, 249 (W.D.N.Y.
1978), appeal docketed, No. 82-7557 (2d Cir. July 19, 1982) (appeal from permanent
injunction issued in No. 77-560 (W.D.N.Y. June 21, 1982) (available July 28, 1982,
on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file)).
169. New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 221
(D.N.J. 1977) ("Since the Times Index is a work more of diligence than of originality
or inventiveness, defendants have greater license to use portions of the Times Index
under the fair use doctrine than they would have if a creative work had been
involved.").
170. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. IV 1980).
171. Id. § 107(1); see Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d
303, 306-07 (2d Cir. 1966) (use of information from magazine in popular biography
promotes public interest in encouraging the development of historical and biographi-
cal works); Key Maps, Inc. v. Pruitt, 470 F. Supp. 33, 38 (S.D. Tex 1978) (defend-
ants' use of maps was fair because it was for the legitimate, reasonable purpose of
coordinating fire prevention activities); Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. Citizens
for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957, 961 (D.N.H. 1978) (use of song in advertise-
ment for political campaign implicated first amendment issues). But see Encyclopae-
dia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243, 252 (W.D.N.Y. 1978)
("This case does not involve an isolated instance of a teacher copying copyrighted
material for classroom use but concerns a highly organized and systematic program
for reproducing videotapes on a massive scale."), appeal docketed, No. 82-7557 (2d
Cir. July 19, 1982) (appeal from permanent injunction issued in No. 77-560
(W.D.N.Y. June 21, 1982) (available July 28, 1982, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file)).
172. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2)(Supp. IV 1980); see Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St.
Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977) ("The principle has most often been
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stantiality of material used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; 173 and, most important, 174 the effect of the use on the copy-
right holder's potential market for the work. 75
If a photographer published a photograph of the arrangement of
lights in a city newspaper, that one-time use of the photograph for its
public interest value would be permissible under the fair use doctrine,
but the photographer's sale of the picture to a calendar company
would not. The latter would be a wholesale taking of the artist's work
which would diminish the artist's market for the work.
Applied to the House Beautiful arrangement of vases, if the news-
paper photographer photographed the arrangement only for use by a
small-circulation newspaper, she would probably win on a fair use
defense. But if she were to photograph all of the stylist's arrangements
in the house and publish them, effectively decreasing the market value
of the work, such actions would not constitute fair use.
A newspaper's right to publish in these two hypotheticals seemed
clear-cut under the fair use doctrine until the Supreme Court decided
a right of publicity case, making repeated analogies to copyright law.
applied to works in the field of science, law, medicine, history and biography."),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc.,
366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966) (same).
173. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3)(Supp. IV 1980); see Iowa State Univ. Research Found.,
Inc. v. ABC, 621 F.2d 57, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1980) (broadcast of eight percent of a film
on three occasions was not fair use); Wainwright See., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript
Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94-96 (2d Cir. 1977) (transcript's publication of abstracts of
Wainwright's research was a taking substantial in quality and quantity), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d
Cir. 1964) (use of song lyrics for parody fell far short of a "substantial" taking);
Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243, 252 (W.D.N.Y.
1978) (videotapes of plaintiff's television broadcasts, which were reproduced and sold
to schools, amounted to more than fair use), appeal docketed, No. 82-7557 (2d Cir.
July 19, 1982) (appeal from permanent injunction issued in No. 77-560 (W.D.N.Y.
June 21, 1982) (available July 28, 1982, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file)).
174. Courts have put the greatest emphasis on the fourth factor when determining
whether use was fair. Triangle Publications v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626
F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1980); see Time, Inc. v. Bernard Gels Assocs., 293 F.Supp.
130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); 3 M. Nimmer, supra note 24, § 13.05[a][4].
175. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (Supp. IV 1980); see Triangle Publications v. Knight-
Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1177 (5th Cir. 1980) (harm to TV Guide of
displaying it on television next to newspaper TV supplement for comparison purposes
was "at most de minimus"); Key Maps, Inc. v. Pruitt, 470 F. Supp. 33, 38 (S.D. Tex.
1978) (defendant's internal use of map for fire department was not commercial and
not in competition with plaintiff but for purposes related to the public interest); Keep
Thomson Governor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957, 961
(D.N.H. 1978) (use of 15 seconds of a song in a 60-second political commercial had
no effect on the potential market for the record of the song); Time, Inc. v. Bernard
Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (considering plaintiff had no
plans for use of photographs, effect of defendant's use of them to create sketches was
speculative).
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In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 7 6 the Court upheld
a state statute that recognized the "right of publicity." The Court
found that the state's interest was "closely analogous to the goals of
patent and copyright law, focusing on the right of the individual to
reap the reward of his endeavors." 177 The Court held that a photog-
rapher who filmed Zacchini's 15-second "human cannonball" act and
televised it against the actor's wishes violated his right of publicity.
The first amendment, the Court said, did not give the media the
right to broadcast Zacchini's entire act without consent,17 8 particu-
larly when "[he] does not seek to enjoin the broadcast of his perform-
ance; he simply wants to be paid for it."1 79 Similarly, for an artist
who has created an environmental work, publicity satisfies a need for
recognition, but pay, particularly given the cost of some of these
creations, satisfies the artist's more immediate financial needs. The
Court pointed out that the protection it afforded Zacchini, like the
copyright law, "provide[d] an economic incentive for him to make the
investment required to produce a performance of interest to the pub-
lic."' 180 Society, the Court said, in the long run is the primary benefi-
ciary.'8 ' Obviously, the performer's act was not akin to hard news,
which would not be copyrightable. 82  Zacchini's act, in fact, was
more like that of an environmental artist. Although the news media
should be free to record any newsworthy "acts," the boundaries of fair
use, and certainly the analogy to Zacchini, should at minimum pre-
vent the photographer from reselling the photograph to a calendar
company without paying the environmental artist a royalty.
C. Infringement
To bring an infringement suit,8 3 House Beautiful or the environ-
mental artist would first have to register their work with the Copy-
right Office. 8 4 This is a simple procedure; in some instances, even a
sketch of the artist's work would suffice.18 5
176. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
177. Id. at 573.
178. Id. at 574-76.
179. Id. at 578.
180. Id. at 576.
181. Id. at 577.
182. International News Serv. v." Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918).
183. To infringe, the second author has to do more than merely use the first
creation for inspiration. See Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exch.,
Inc., 575 F.2d 62, 65 (3d Cir.) ("[Ain artist is free to consult the same source for
another original painting."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978); Oxford Book Co. v.
College Entrance Book Co., 98 F.2d 688, 691 (2d Cir. 1938) ("The defendant authors
were as free to read [plaintiff's book] as anyone else and to acquire from it such
information as they could.").
184. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (Supp. IV 1980).
185. See id. §§ 408(b)(1), 409. See supra note 127.
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To prove infringement, the respective plaintiffs first must show that
defendant photographers had access to their work.186  Access is de-
fined as a reasonable opportunity to view a plaintiffs work18 7 and is
proven circumstantially.' 88 In the case of the House Beautiful ar-
rangement, the homeowner's testimony that she permitted the news-
paper photographer to enter her home would be strong circumstantial
evidence of access. In the case of the building lights, the photographer
might argue that it was not, in fact, the artist's work that she photo-
graphed. Testimony of the building managers, however, that the
lights were illuminated in that particular configuration for only one
night, would be strong circumstantial evidence that it was only the
artist's work the photographer could have photographed.
As a precaution, however, it would be helpful in all situations if the
stylist or artist made and saved sketches or memoranda of their proj-
ects. Artists often make sketches, but they do not think to date and file
them in anticipation of an infringement action. Such evidence would
prove useful if a defendant tried to assert, for example, that her
creation predated that of the plaintiff's.' 89
In addition to access, a plaintiff must also show that there is sub-
stantial similarity in the ideas of both works, 19 0 and that the expression
of those ideas 19' would appear to be substantially similar in the eyes of
the ordinary lay observer.192  Sketches or a snapshot would be neces-
186. Overman v. Loesser, 205 F.2d 521, 524 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 910
(1953). But see Williams v. Kaag Mfg., Inc., 338 F.2d 949, 951 (9th Cir. 1964)
("Access is important, and should be given due weight by the trier of fact, but is not
decisive."); Burnett v. Lambino, 204 F. Supp. 327, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) ("Access
alone without copying is insufficient to find infringement.").
187. Miller Brewing Co. v. Carling O'Keefe Breweries, 452 F. Supp. 429, 438
(W.D.N.Y. 1978); Musto v. Meyer, 434 F. Supp. 32, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 598
F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979); Bevan v. CBS, 329 F. Supp. 601, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). If
plaintiff's product, for example, were on the market for a number of years, defend-
ant would be presumed to have seen it. Goldman-Morgen, Inc. v. Dan Brechner &
Co., 411 F. Supp. 382, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Blazon, Inc. v. DeLuxe Game Corp.,
268 F. Supp. 416, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
188. Miller Brewing Co. v. Carling O'Keefe Breweries, 452 F. Supp. 429, 438
(W.D.N.Y. 1978); Goldman-Morgen, Inc. v. Dan Brechner & Co., 411 F. Supp.
382, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
189. See Overman v. Loesser, 205 F.2d 521, 524 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
910 (1953).
190. Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164
(9th Cir. 1977); Jason v. Fonda, 526 F. Supp. 774, 777 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
191. Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163
(9th Cir. 1977); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930),
cert denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931); see Bevan v. CBS, 329 F. Supp. 601, 604-05
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
192. Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164
(9th Cir. 1977); Jason v. Fonda, 526 F. Supp. 774, 777 (C.D. Cal. 1981); Miller
Brewing Co. v. Carling O'Keefe Breweries, 452 F. Supp. 429, 439 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
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sary, if the short-lived work of art were not still standing, for a
plaintiff to prove that the photographer appropriated her idea and its
expression. House Beautiful, of course, could use its freelance photog-
rapher's photograph of the arrangement to prove such appropriation.
D. Coauthorship
Photographers, because they have long been covered by copyright,
are among the best-protected artists in the marketplace. Generally,
photographers assume they own all rights to a photograph, unless they
have contracted them away on a work-for-hire basis. 19 3 If the work
of a stylist is given copyright protection, the photographer will then
have to ask the stylist to sign a work-for-hire agreement 194 in order to
cut off her copyright in the work. Should the stylist not want to give
up her copyright, the photographer can bargain with her for
coauthorship status. 19 5 Similarly, an environmental artist may grant
a photographer the right to reproduce her work.19 6 The resulting
photograph would be considered a derivative work19 7 and, assuming
the agreement permitted it, the photographer would then be free to
sell her photograph to a newspaper, calendar company or T-shirt
manufacturer.
Copyright protection of the stylist's work will not wrongfully di-
minish the rights of photographers; rather, it will help to clarify their
rights. In fact, in the first Supreme Court case to consider copyright
protection for a work other than a literal writing, the Court recog-
nized authorship in the work that today is done by a stylist.'98  In
holding that a photograph of Oscar Wilde was an original work of art,
the Court found authorship in "selecting and arranging the costume,
draperies, and other various accessories in said photograph, arranging
the subject so as to present graceful outlines, arranging and disposing
the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the desired expression." 199
The photographer himself did the arranging in that case, but today
it is the photographic stylist who selects and arranges clothes in a
193. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
194. Id.
195. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (Supp. IV 1980) ("Copyright in a work protected under
this title vests initially in the author or authors of the work. The authors of a joint
work are coowners of copyright in the work."). A joint work is defined in 17 U.S.C. §
101 (Supp. IV 1980) as "a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention
that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a
unitary whole." See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 221 F.2d
569, 570 (2d Cir.), opinion revised per curiam on rehearing, 223 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.
1955).
196. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
197. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (Supp. IV 1980); 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 24,
§ 2.01[A].
198. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884).
199. Id.
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fashion photograph, and it is she who often directs the photographer's
lighting of the subject, evoking the desired mood. 200 After concluding
that the photograph was a work of authorship, the Court attempted
to identify its author. It quoted an English case that described the
author as one
"who effectively is as near as he can be, the cause of the picture
which is produced, that is, the person who has superintended the
arrangement, who has actually formed the picture by putting the
persons in position, and arranging the place where the people are
to be - the man who is the effective cause of that. 20 '
Today that person is often the stylist, and she merits coauthorship
status when a photographer records her work.
Another early court case also recognized the arrangement of mate-
rial as the critical component of authorship in a photograph, rather
than any expertise the photographer brought to his art.202  In that
case a photographer positioned a nude woman against a backdrop and
photographed her with her face in repose.20 3 He sold and assigned all
rights in the photograph to the plaintiff.20 4 Two years later, the same
"200. It is much more true of fashion photography or portraiture than of architec-
tural photography, however, that the interaction between photographer and model
often results in the characteristic expression recognizable as the stamp of a particular
photographer. One court recognized this interaction in an early photography case,
Falk v. Donaldson, 57 F. 32 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893). Defendant infringers argued that
the photographer was a mere mechanic and that the true author of the photograph of
an actress, Julia Marlowe, was the actress herself. The court said: "How far the
artistic contributions are to be attributed to the talent of Miss Marlowe, it is impos-
sible to say." Id. at 33. The court noted, however, that the photograph showed Miss
Marlowe in a side view in which "she could not have judged, by herself, how far to
turn the body, and raise the hands, or how to incline the head, so that the lights and
shadows might best reveal the beauties of face and figure." Id.
201. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 61 (1884) (quoting
Nottage v. Jackson, 11 Q.B.D. 627, 635 (1883)).
202. Gross v. Seligman, 212 F. 930 (2d Cir. 1914). Some courts, however, have
recognized the art a photographer brings to his work. E.g., Time, Inc. v. Bernard
Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ("Zapruder selected the kind of
camera ... the kind of film ... the kind of lens ... the area in which the pictures
were to be taken, the time they were to be taken, and (after testing several sites) the
spot on which the camera would be operated."); Jewelers' Circular Publishing Co. v.
Keystone Publishing Co., 274 F. 932, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) ("[N]o photograph,
however simple, can be unaffected by the personal influence of the author, and no
two will be absolutely alike."), aff'd, 281 F. 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581
(1922); Pagano v. Chas. Beseler Co., 234 F. 963, 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) ("It undoubt-
edly requires originality to determine just when to take the photograph, so as to bring
out the proper setting for both animate and inanimate objects, with the adjunctive
features of light, shade, position, etc."). See generally Gorman, supra note 72, at
1594-98.
203. Gross v. Seligman, 212 F. 930, 930 (2d Cir. 1914).
204. Id.
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photographer posed the same nude woman against a slightly different
backdrop and photographed her smiling, with a cherry stem in her
mouth.2 0 5 The court noted some changes in the model's figure in the
two-year interval but said:
It seems to us, however, that we have no ... new photograph of
the same model. The identity of the artist and the many close
identities of pose, light, and shade, etc., indicate very strongly that
the first picture was used to produce the second .... The one
thing, viz., the exercise of artistic talent, which made the first
photographic picture a subject of copyright, has been used not to
produce another picture, but to duplicate the original. 206
CONCLUSION
Congress and the courts should explicitly recognize that short-lived
works of art deserve copyright protection. Such protection, which is
designed to give an author a fair return for her creative effort in order
to encourage additional effort, should benefit all artists who want to
take advantage of it.
Copyright protection for an arrangement of objects would give
stylists greater recognition for their work. For example, freelance
stylists often receive credit only when their work is first published.
Some stylists would be happy merely to receive a credit line each time
their work is reproduced.
Recognizing an arrangement of objects under the Act would also
put a stylist in a more equitable position when bargaining with maga-
zine editors and photographers for royalties. A stylist who freelances,
for example, is paid by the day at a fraction of what a photographer is
paid, although the resulting photograph depicts her work. The pho-
tographer may be paid depending upon her contract with the maga-
zine, not only when the photograph is originally printed, but also
whenever it appears in a spin-off of the magazine, in a book or in
magazines abroad. Normally, the stylist is paid once. Surely work that
is so repeatedly exploited by the marketplace deserves explicit copy-
right protection by Congress and the courts.
Similarly, an environmental artist, who often expends not only a
great deal of time creating her works, but also a great deal of money,
205. Id.
206. Id. at 931. But see Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exch., Inc.,
575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.) (artist did not infringe his own work when he used different
source materials for each painting and similarities resulted from anatomical correct-
ness of the renderings), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978); Esquire, Inc. v. Varga
Enters., 81 F. Supp. 306, 309 (N.D. Ill. 1948) (while "Varga girls" were all Alberto
Vargas ever drew, "all of the distinguishing elements, considered in the aggregate,
undeniably constitute a new creative work of art"), modified, 185 F.2d 14 (7th Cir.
1950).
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should have her creative and cash investments explicitly protected by
Congress and the courts. Environmental artists should feel secure in
their right to copyright protection and to pursue infringers who can
almost instantly turn out T-shirts commemorating their work or who
can find ready markets for photographs in the calendar and poster
industries.
Only when the work of all artists is accorded copyright protection
will Congress truly have fulfilled its constitutional mandate of pro-
moting "the Progress of Science and the useful Arts."
Joan Infarinato
